Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 8

Issue 1

Article 5

January 1993

To Apply or Not to Apply: Extraterritorial Application of Federal
RICO Laws
Kelly Christie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Christie, Kelly (1993) "To Apply or Not to Apply: Extraterritorial Application of Federal RICO Laws," Florida
Journal of International Law: Vol. 8: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Christie: To Apply or Not to Apply: Extraterritorial Application of Federal

To APPLY OR NOT TO APPLY: EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF FEDERAL RICO LAWS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

...............

131

II.

HISTORY ....................................

132

III.

INSTANT CASE .................................

135

IV.

ANALYSIS..................................... 137

V.

CONCLUSION .................................. 140

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Plaintiffs, foreign seamen who worked aboard the ship M/V Fir Grove,
filed federal RICO' claims against the defendant, a group of foreign ship
owners. 2 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants purposefully misrepresented
employment wages to the plaintiffs and to the International Transport
Workers Federation3 by engaging in a continuous "pattern of racketeering." 4 Plaintiffs asserted that United States RICO laws should govern because the ship travelled between Japan and the United States, and the alleged practices therefore had an adverse impact upon U.S. commerce.5
Defendants moved to dismiss the RICO claims by alleging that there were
not sufficient contacts with the United States to invoke the application of

1. RICO is an acronym for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization. 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611965 (1988).
2. Jose v. MN Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349 (D. Or. 1991). Plaintiffs are 14 Filipino nationals.
Defendants, a group of Japanese investors acting through various corporations, are owners and operators
of the MN Fir Grove.
3. Id. at 353. International Transport Workers Federation is an organization that monitors and
attempts to equalize shipping costs, wages and working conditions through its development of a world-

wide wage scale. See generally HERBERT NORTHRUP,
ERATION AND FLAG OF CONVENIENCE SHIPPING

THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS' FED-

(1983).

4. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 353.
5. Id. at 353-54. Section 1962(a) of RICO states: "It shall be unlawful for any person who has
received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities
of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
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the federal RICO statute. 6 The district court found that the wage misrepresentations that might support federal RICO claims occurred outside the U.S.
territory, and the foreign plaintiffs' claims depended upon whether RICO
could be applied extraterritorially.7 The District Court of Oregon found that
there was a lack of clear congressional intent for the statute to apply
abroad, and HELD, the federal RICO statutes did not apply
extraterritorially'
II. HISTORY
Extraterritorial application of federal law is a highly contested issue that
appears throughout U.S. judicial history.9 Concerned with the international
ramifications of applying U.S. law abroad, courts continually analyzed on
a case-by-case basis whether Congress intended for each federal act to
apply extraterritorially." Since most statutes were silent as to their extraterritorial application, courts sought guidance from both legislative history
and general policy rationales." As a result, federal courts created various
balancing tests that incorporated both history and policy factors in order to
compare U.S. interests with the sovereign rights of foreign nations. 3
The Ninth District Court of Appeals developed an elaborate set of
guidelines in order to determine the extraterritorial scope of U.S. antitrust

6. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 354.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 357.
9. See generally Brilmayer, The ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law: A Methodological
and ConstitutionalAppraisal, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 11 (1987) (discussing the controversy of
applying American law to international situations).
10. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22
(1963) (discussing the "delicate field of international relations" and the reluctance of the United States to
invite retaliatory action if American laws are applied extraterritorially); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211-13 (1962) (warning courts not to intervene excessively in the area of foreign policy).
11. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) ("[L]egislation of Congress, unless
a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
(quoting Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932))).
12. See Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286-88 (discussing legislative history and policy concerns to
show that Congress intended the eight-hour law to apply to domestic labor conditions only).
13. See Phillip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV.
665, 697 (1986):
[The test for the extraterritorial validity of statutes] is applied by balancing a number of
factors to determine whether the United States interest is sufficiently high, as compared
with the foreign interest, to justify application of United States law. The factors range
from the vague and imponderable - like the importance of the regulation in question to
the international, political, legal or economic systems and whether it is "consistent with
the traditions of the international system" - to more concrete factors like the nationality of the parties and location of the conduct.
Id. at 697.
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laws in Timberlane Labor Co. v. Bank of America.14 The plaintiffs contended that the foreign defendants maintained a monopoly on the lumber
export business in Honduras, which directly harmed U.S. commerce. 5 The
plaintiffs claimed that this effect on U.S. commerce invoked federal antitrust laws, even though the statute was silent as to its extraterritorial application. 6 In determining whether to apply federal antitrust laws
extraterritorially, the Timberlane court discussed the inadequacy of the
traditional "direct and substantial effects" test' due to its narrow scope. 8
The Timberlane court stated that this traditional effects test often resulted in
excessive intrusion on the sovereign rights of foreign countries.' 9
In response, the Timberlane court developed a broader tripartite analysis
that incorporated and expanded upon the previous test. 20 First, the
defendant's actions must intend to or actually effect U.S. commerce;2 second, the plaintiff must show a substantial burden;22 and finally, the United
States must display an interest that is stronger than that of the foreign country.23 The Timberlane court further explained the newly articulated third
prong of the tripartite analysis by listing several factors that were relevant
constituent parts of it.24 These elements included: (1) the degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy, (2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the locations or principal places of business, (3) the extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, (4) the
relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere, (5) the degree to which there is a purpose to harm or affect U.S.
commerce, (6) the foreseeability of such effect, and (7) the relative impor-

14. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. Id. at 601.
16. Id. at 601, 610. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 reaches "[every] contact... in
restraint of... and [every] person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize... any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." Plaintiffs relied upon this section
to allege that the statute was intended by Congress to apply extraterritorially. Id.
17. Id. at 611-12. "The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider the other
nation's interests. Nor does it expressly take into account the full nature of the relationship between the
actors and [the United States]." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 613.
21. Id. This element is necessary so that federal courts have proper subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
22. Id.; see also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 103 n.15
(C.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that plaintiffs were substantially affected
"when control of an item in commerce is wrested from one competitor by another"). The court then
defined a substantial burden as that which is not "insubstantial and indirect." Id.
23. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613; see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40:
"Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law
to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction." Id.
24. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 597.
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tance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad." Based upon incorporation of the third prong,
the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes could
s
be overcome only if U.S. interests were strong enough to warrant it.
From this extensive analysis that looked to legislative history and policy
considerations, the Timberlane court held that federal antitrust law was intended by Congress to apply extraterritorially."
While not directly utilizing the Timberlane test, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida looked beyond the silent federal RICO
statute and determined that it applied extraterritorially in United States v.
2
Noriega.
' Defendant was charged with participating in a "pattern of racketeering,' .29in violation of RICO statutes, for involvement in a drug cartel.3° Defendant moved to dismiss by arguing that U.S. laws should not
apply to a foreign leader for alleged illegal acts that took place outside of
the United States.3 In analyzing the extraterritorial applicability of RICO,
the court discussed the traditional effects test by analyzing statutory and
legislative history.32
Like the Timberlane court, the Noriega court further defined the traditional effects test by noting that a mere intent to produce effects in the
United States is sufficient, regardless of actual effects produced.33 Also,
the Noriega court noted the need to consider foreign effects by invoking a
reasonableness test that considers three factors: the character of the activity
regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, and the degree to which the regulation is accepted.' The Noriega court also employed a modified version of the traditional effects test similar to that employed by the Timberlane court.35 With this framework in place, the
Noriega court found that federal RICO laws apply extraterritorially.36 Even

25. Id.
26. Id. at 615 n.34. The court advises: "It is merely the relative involvement and concern of each
state with the suit at hand that is to be evaluated in determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be exercised by American courts as a matter of comity and fairness." Id.
27. Id. at 615.
28. 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
29. Id. at 1510. The government contended that this activity was a possible violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c)-(d) specifically.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1513; see also Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) ("Acts done outside a
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it,
justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting
him within its power.")
-33. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1513.
34. Id. at 1515.
35. Id. at 1516.
36. Id. at 1517.
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though the statute is silent, the Noriega court noted that Congress intended
for RICO to be widely interpreted." By analyzing both policy and legislative history, the Noriega court reached the same result as the Timberlane
court, concluding that the federal law in question applied extraterritorially.
Departing from precedent, the Supreme Court of the United States took
a narrow approach to the interpretation of the extraterritorial application of
federal statutes in Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC) v. Arabian
American Oil Co.3" Petitioner, a U.S. citizen working abroad for a U.S.
subsidiary, brought suit against his employer for employment discrimination
under Title VII.39 Petitioner argued that Title VII should apply
extraterritorially because of its "broad jurisdictional language" regarding
commerce and alien exemptions.' Respondents contended that the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the general commerce language
of Title VII was insufficient to invoke extraterritorial application."'
In denying extraterritorial application of Title VII, the Supreme Court
stated that an act must clearly indicate the affirmative intent of Congress to
apply it abroad.42 The Arabian court characterized the act's reference to
commerce and alien exemption clauses as mere boilerplate language which
did not show clear congressional intent.43 The Arabian court continued by
noting that, read as a whole, the statute suggested a "purely domestic focus."' The Arabian court examined this plain meaning of the statute and
held that Title VII did not apply extraterritorially.45 In a vigorous dissent,
three Justices noted that the majority's analysis parted from the traditional
analysis of both legislative history and policy aspects.'
III. INSTANT CASE

In the instant case, the Federal District Court of Oregon rejected
plaintiffs argument supporting the extraterritorial application of the RICO

37, Id. Congress specifically stated that "RICO [should be] liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purpose." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970).
38. 499.U.S. 244 (1991).
39. Id. at 247.
40. Id. at 248-49. An employer is subject to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, if it is "engaged in
any industry affecting commerce." The petitioner also argues that the "alien exemption clause," 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-1, implied that Congress intended to protect American citizens employed abroad. Id.
41. Id. at 249. Respondents maintain that the statute's "commerce" language does not extend to
regulation of conduct within a foreign country.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 250-51. The Court noted that numerous acts contain similar boilerplate language, none of
which applies extraterritorially. Id.
44. Id. at 255. The Court noted that Title VII failed to mention foreign proceedings such as mechanisms for overseas enforcement or conflicts with foreign law. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 260.
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statute.47 The instant court found that the general presumption against extraterritoriality could only be overcome by an explicit intent demonstrated
by Congress within the statute itself.48 The instant court then noted in the
alternative that even if RICO was intended by Congress to apply
extraterritorially, it did not apply in the instant case.49 In originally finding
that generally federal RICO was not intended by Congress to apply
extraterritorially, the instant court relied on the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Arabian." The plaintiffs argued that RICO should apply
extraterritorially because of language in the statute that prohibits "racketeering" activities which "affect interstate or foreign commerce."'" However, the instant court found that this language was too vague because it did
not establish a clear congressional intent. 2
The instant court then discussed Noriega, which found, contrary to the
instant court, that RICO applied extraterritorially.53 The instant court noted
that the language of RICO is extensive and has been construed broadly by
courts.' While this fact provided a basis for the Noriega court to apply
RICO extraterritorially,55 the instant court made a further distinction which
limited RICO to apply only domestically.56 The instant court reasoned that
RICO's broad construction extends solely to conduct, and RICO is geographically limited to the territory of the United States by the procedural
mechanisms provided in the act itself. 7 The instant court reasoned that
since the act contained no procedures for foreign application, and the statute
in general did not address extraterritorial application, then, according to
Arabian, the act extends only to the territory of the United States.5"
However, the instant court did not completely reject the traditional
effects tests for determining extraterritoriality. The court stated that even if
RICO did apply to foreign countries in general, under these specific facts it
did not.59 In reaching this holding, the instant court employed the tripartite
analysis utilized in Timberlane to the facts before it.' First, the effect on
U.S. commerce due to the plaintiffs receiving substandard wages from the

47. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 357.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 357 n.12.
51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
52. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 357.
53. Id. at 356.
54. Id.; see RICO STATEMENTS OF FINDING AND PURPOSE, H.R. REP. No. 452, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 484 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1073.
55. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 356.
56. Id. at 357.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. id.
60. Id.
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defendants was negligible." Second, there was no evidence that the defendants intended to affect U.S. commerce.62 Third, the interests of the United
States were minor compared to those of the home country of the
plaintiffs.63 Therefore, based upon either the traditional effects test or
Arabian's new clear congressional intent standard, the instant court found
that RICO did not apply extraterritorially under these specific facts.' Although it is well settled that statutory construction is determined solely by
congressional intent,65 the instant court narrowed the former analysis of
congressional intent by looking solely to the statutory language.'
IV. ANALYSIS
Traditional common law statutory interpretation like that undertaken by
the Timberlane court includes an examination of policy considerations and
legislative history in addition to the plain meaning of the language in order
to ascertain congressional intent. 7 The Noriega court adopted this broad
form of analysis in determining the scope of the RICO statute and finding
that it did apply extraterritorially." In contrast, the instant court retreated
both from the traditional effects test and from the holdings of the
Timberlane and Noriega courts in finding that Congress did not intend for
RICO to apply extraterritorially.6 9
The instant court justified this retreat from the traditional effects test by
relying on the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Arabian."
However, both the instant court and the Arabian court failed to fully articulate why Arabian's intent standard, or as the dissent called it, the "clear
statement rule,"'" was the appropriate analysis to undertake. The dissent in

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 357-58. The instant court noted that this third factor was the most significant because of
the effect of these wage misrepresentations in the Philippines. The defendant's actions, if proven, will
have a great impact on employment and recruitment practice standards in the Philippines. Id.
64. Id. at 358.
65. See, e.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there must be
present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision where the possibili-

ties of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.
id. at 147.
66. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 357.
67. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.

68.

See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.

69. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 357.
70. Id. at 357 n.12.
71. Arabian, 499 U.S. at 261-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Clear statement rule" was the term
adopted by the dissent in referring to the analysis utilized by the majority. Id. at 261. The dissent also
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Arabian suggested that the distinction between employing the clear statement rule or the traditional effects test depended upon whether the given
statute invoked "international comity questions"72 that challenged the law
of the foreign country. 3 This reasoning by the dissent established a basis
in order to determine which test to employ, and the instant court's analysis
would appear more complete if it had included reasoning explaining why it
invoked the clear statement rule instead of the traditional effects test.
By ignoring legislative history and policy considerations, 4 the instant
court arguably frustrates the intent of Congress by holding that RICO cannot apply extraterritorially." In discussing the breadth of RICO, the
Noriega court noted that Congress insisted that RICO be broadly construed
so that it could be an effective statute in eradicating harmful racketeering
conduct.76 In fact, the instant court acknowledges that RICO is extensive
and continually applies to a broad range of activities.' The Noriega court,
for example, after considering congressional history,78 as well as the policy
considerations of the eradication of crime,79 reasoned that RICO should
apply- extraterritorially as long as there is an actual or intended effect on the
United States.s' The instant court dismisses this line of reasoning by main-

noted that, "Clear statement rules operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than to shield important values from an insufficiently strong legislative intent to displace them." Id. at 262.
72. Id. at 265. International comity questions require consideration whenever a certain construction
of an American statute would displace the domestic law of another nation. This is a difficult analysis
that courts seek to avoid by shifting the burden to Congress to make an express assertion if they intend
to displace the laws of a foreign nation. Courts shift this burden by requiring a clear statement of congressional intent within the plain meaning of the statute. Id.
73. Id.
74. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 357. While the court states that it considers legislative history, it does so
only through quoting Noriega. The court subsequently dismisses this history by looking back to the
plain meaning of the statute and referring to its lack of extraterritorial procedures. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also infra note 78.
77. Jose, F. Supp. at 356-57.
78. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1517; see also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Congress deliberately chose to employ broad terms which would
defy judicial confinement... Congress chose to employ that extraordinarily broad language in order to
achieve its desired goals.").
79. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1516-17; see RICO STATEMENTS OF FINDING AND PURPOSE, H.R.
Rep. No. 452, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 484 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C C.A.N. 1073. Congress stated:
(I) organized crime in the United States ... annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy ...(3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and
corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic
processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the
Nation's economic system ....interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its
citizens.
Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1516.
80. Noriega, 746 F. Supp at 1517.
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taining that RICO is intended to apply to a broad range of conduct, but not
a broad geographic range due to its lack of procedural mechanisms.8
Thus, the instant court ignored the strong history and policy arguments for
extraterritorial application of RICO by focusing on the lack of specific
procedural guidelines in determining that RICO does not apply
extraterritorially. 2
After holding that RICO cannot apply extraterritorially, the instant court
analyzed, in the alternative, how the given set of facts specifically would
not invoke RICO extraterritorially even if RICO did generally apply
abroad. 3 This analysis weakens the main part of the instant court's reasoning by suggesting that the instant court believes it could be wrong in its
denial of the general extraterritorial application of RICO. In this analysis,
the instant court shifts back to utilizing the traditional effects test presented
in Timberlane.'4 This reliance on the traditional effects test shows the instant court's general discomfort with its reliance on the clear statement rule,
as articulated in Arabian and its progeny.
However, this traditional effects test strengthens the instant court's
holding in denying the extraterritorial application of RICO to this specific
set of facts. The court notes that the low wages paid to the foreign seamen
were not intended by the defendants to effect U.S. commerce and, in fact,
had virtually no effect on it. 5 Most importantly, the court notes that the
foreign seamen's home country had a much stronger interest in this labor
dispute than did the United States. 6 By applying the Timberlane test, the
instant court presents a convincing and orderly analysis stating why the
U.S. interests were too weak to justify extraterritorial application of federal
RICO laws in this case." Here, the instant court applies the law to the set
of facts before it and creates a more complete analysis instead of just stating a rule of law with virtually no analysis as it did in the first part of the
opinion in declining to apply RICO extraterritorially in general.

81. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 357.
82. Id. But see Brink's Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff was not limited to domestic service of process by the RICO statute, but could use state procedure to
reach foreign defendants abroad).
83. Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 357.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
87. Noriega, 801 F. Supp. at 357; see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION

As a result of the instant court's adoption of the clear statement rule as
the sole prerequisite to give effect to congressional intent, the instant court
imposes a large burden on Congress. 8 Absent clear provisions in the statute articulating its specific extraterritorial application, Congress can no
longer rely on the judiciary to carry out its legislative intent." Legislative
history and policy concerns will become insignificant since the court will
only look to the plain meaning of the statute in order to determine a
statute's extraterritorial application. What previously was considered a mere
rebuttable presumption against extraterritoriality' has been converted
abruptly into a direct denial of extraterritoriality as a result of Arabian's
clear statement rule and the instant court's adoption of this standard."' The
instant court, while adopting the Supreme Court's clear statement rule in its
original analysis of RICO's extraterritorial application, retreats from it by
later applying the traditional effects test. This use of both tests shows the
instant court's reluctance to rely on this dramatic change in interpretation
invoked by the Supreme Court. The instant court's reluctance is well founded considering that many statutes which were clearly intended by Congress
to apply extraterritorially as evidenced by legislative history, will no longer
have their intended effects because of the strictness of this newly promulgated rule.92
Kelly Christie

88. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REv. 177, 370
(1991) (stating that the clear statement rule may signal a general expansion of the rule that could threaten to undermine congressional intent for previously drafted statutes); see also Arabian, 499 U.S. at 278
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's clear statement rule has erected a "barrier to any
genuine inquiry into the sources that reveal Congress' actual intentions"). Id.
89. See supra text accompanying note 87.
90. Arabian, 499 U.S. at 278 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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